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SECURITIES REGULATION: RULE lOb-5 PROVIDES A
BASIS FOR STOCKBROKER'S SUIT AGAINST A
DEFRAUDING PURCHASER
A CASE of first impression, A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow' allowed a
broker to assert a federal cause of action against a defrauding stock
purchaser under section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
19342 and rule l0b-5.3 A. T. Brod & Co., stockbrokers, alleged that
Jack and Adele Perlow placed orders for several securities listed and
traded on the New York Stock Exchange, fraudulently intending to
pay for those shares only if their market price increased before
payment was due. When the price of the shares declined and pay-
ment was not forthcoming, Brod sold the securities at a loss and
sought to recover damages in a suit predicated upon the Perlows'
alleged violation of rule lOb-5. The district court dismissed Brod's
complaint, concluding that Brod was not an investor, and that no
fraud involving the investment value of the security nor any fraud
usually associated with securities transactions had been alleged.
Finding the district court's construction of 10 (b) and lOb-5 "too
narrow," the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.4
Section 10 (b), the "catch-all" clause of the Exchange Act,5
authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission to prescribe
such rules and regulations to combat manipulative or deceptive
devices and contrivances "as [are] necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors."" Under the
authority of this section, the SEC promulgated rule lOb-5, which,
subject to express jurisdictional conditions, renders unlawful all
fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase or sale of securi-
ties. Since Kardon v. National Gypsum Co..,7 the courts have in-
375 F2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1964).
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.106-5 (1964, Supp. 1966).
'375 F.2d at 396.
See Hearings on Stock Exchange Regulation Before the House Commitee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (testimony of Mr. Thomas
G. Corcoran) quoted in Ruder, Civil Liability Under 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legis.
lative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. Rv. 627, 658 (1963); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
18 (1934). See also Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 1953).
' 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1964).
7 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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ferred civil liability for violations of the rule and have construed rule
lOb-5 to impose few restrictions on the defrauded claimant. Recovery
has not been limited to transactions within the organized securities
markets.8 Further, the rejection of privity as a prerequisite to an
actionable claim 9 and the existence of diminutive scienter ° and, in
some jurisdictions, reliance" requirements have increased the avail-
ability of the remedy. At present, the only substantial impediment
to civil relief under lOb-5 is a notion that the litigant must be a
"defrauded purchaser or seller"' 2 but even this stricture has been
latitudinately construed.' 3
Accounting for the virtual absence of hobbling construction is a
continuing assault on narrow definition of the rule by those anxious
to gain the advantages 14 of litigating securities fraud claims in the
federal courts. The terse language of rule lOb-5 has induced con-
fining judicial interpretations, but with the exception of the pur-
chaser/seller limitation all have been overruled or distinguished.
Thus, neither the availability of a common law remedy in the state
courts15 nor the possibility of a more restricted remedy under another
B Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Fratt v. Robinson, 208 F.2d 627 (9th
Cir. 1958); H. L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
0 Miller v. Bargain City, U.SA., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1964); see Cooper
v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Comment, 74 YALE
L.J. 658 (1965). But see Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp.
701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), af'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952); Meisel v. North Jersey Trust
Co., 218 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Donovan v. Taylor, 186 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Cal.
1955).
10 Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961); Texas Continental Life Ins.
Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960), rev'd on other grounds
sub. nom. Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 807 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); see
O'Neill v. Maytag, 889 F.2d 764, 767-68 (2d Cir. 1964); Note, 63 Micss. L. REv. 1070
(1965). But see Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Trussell v.
United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Co. 1964). Cf. Dack v. Shanman,
227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
"I See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); Ruder,
supra note 5, at 678.
12 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 198 F.2d 461, 468 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 843
U.S. 956 (1952). See also Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 198 F.2d
888, 887 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., dissenting) (1Ob-5 not limited to common law fraud).
28 See, e.g., Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), 1967 DUKE
L.J. 898; Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 202-03 (5th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 865 U.S. 814 (1961).
'"See 3 Loss, SEcuRrrss REGULATION 1763-97 (2d ed. 1961); Latty, The Aggrieved
Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close Corporation Under the SE.C. Statutes,
18 LAiw & CONTEMP. PROB. 505, 525-34 (1953); Comment, Private Remedies Available
under Rule 10b.5, 20 Sw. L.J. 620 (1966).
12 Compare Beury v. Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786, 789-90 (S.D.W. Va. 1954), disapproved,
222 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1955), with Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 56 (N.D.
Ohio 1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960).
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provision of the securities law will presently bar a lOb-5 complaint.10
Likewise, privity between vendor and purchaser, once thought
requisite, appears to be no longer demanded.17 Brod, too, involves
the interment of judicial gloss, for the district court dismissed Brod's
complaint upon the strength of dictum in Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp.18
In Birnbaum, the Second Circuit construed lOb-5 as "directed
solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually
associated with the sale or purchase of securities . . . ."9 Specifically
rejecting this dictum, as well as the district court's related holdings
that a lOb-5 plaintiff must be an investor and the fraud be alleged
as to the investment value of the security, the Second Circuit in
Brod held that section 10 (b) and rule lOb-5 prohibit all fraudulent
schemes in connection with the sale or purchase of securities, even
"garden type" varieties of fraud.20 Emphasizing the language of the
provisions, rather than judicial precedent and legislative history, the
court observed that neither the statute nor the rule explicitly limit
the proscribed conduct to fraud involving investors or the investment
value of the securities. To have inferred such qualifications from
the language of the provisions would have offended the remedial
purposes deemed inherent in the securities laws by the Supreme
Court.2 ' Thus, dismissal was improper, for Brod's complaint met all
the requirements of a 1Ob-5 action: the practices allegedly employed
by the Perlows were fraudulent; the fraud was committed "in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of [a] security"; 22 and the fraud
had been perpetrated by means of a facility of a national securities
exchange.23
The Second Circuit stretched no definitions to find federal juris-
diction in Brod. Neither the cases nor the legislative history support
the narrow construction given 1Ob-5 by the district court. The
ascendant purpose of the Exchange Act was to assure the integrity of
16 Compare Montague v. Electronic Corp. of America, 76 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y.
1948), with Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
17 See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
Is 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
19 193 F.2d at 464.
20 375 F.2d at 397.
21 375 F.2d at 396, citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
195 (1963). See also J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-34 (1964).
22 77 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964, Supp. 1966).
23 375 F.2d at 397.
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the securities marketing process, 24 and toward that end rule 10b-5
was issued.25 Though many -claimants under the rule have been
investors,26 and the fraud has often involved the investment value of
the stock,27 those elements have not been prerequisite to a lOb-5
claim.28 Accordingly, such interpretive limitations were properly
rejected by the Brod court. Significant, too, in Brod is the recogni-
tion of a civil remedy coextensive with the injunctive power of the
SEC. The very existence of a private right under the securities laws
has been predicated at least in part on the self-enforcing qualities
which civil liability imparts to a statute.29 If a private right is to be
created which will effectively promote the ends of the statute, illegal
conduct subject to SEC injunction should also be the basis of a civil
action. The Brod court tacitly indicated that the private right en-
compasses the injunctive jurisdiction of the SEC, for Judge Kaufman
premised his finding that the Perlows' alleged conduct was fraudulent
upon prior cases in which the SEC procured injunctions against
similar conduct. 0
"' See Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 202 (5th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 1953); Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1964).
2r See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952).
21 See, e.g., Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 870 (1961); Pfeffer v. Cressaty, 223 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
27 See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Speed v.
Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
28 See, e.g., Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 202 (5th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961) (investor status not required); Glickman v.
Schweickart 9: Co., 242 F. Supp. 670, 673-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (misrepresentation need
not involve the security itself); Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972, 978
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (10b-5 not limited to fraud in exchange of consideration); M. L. Lee
& Co. v. American Cardboard & Packaging Corp., 36 F.R.D. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1964)
(claimant not investor; alleged fraud neither in security's value, nor fraud "usually
associated with" securities transactions).
2 See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
00 375 F.2d at 397, citing, e.g., SEC v. DuBory, Civ. No. 1614, D. Mass., Oct. 6, 1966;
SEC v. Greenwald, Civ. No. 60-1022, S.D.N.Y., Jan. 18, 1963.
